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The last few years have witnessed truly extraordinaryevents in the formerly communist societies. These countries were characterized by the
great importance attached to social policy as opposed to market economy
countries with a similarlevel of economic growth. However, the transition
process toward a market economy has set new conditionsfor the functioning of governing levels and companies, which has affected social policies
altogether. On the one hand, economic liberalization has brought about
a reduction of the Russian Government's intervention in the economy,
particularly in social policy. On the other hand, the privatization of the
state company in a post-communist society would have implied a new
way of economic management based on the principal of competition, in
direct opposition to the nature of communist companies. Consequently,
such a view of the reforms suggests a social policy of a lower magnitude.
However, the difficulties of the transitionsnow underway in the countries
that are emerging from communism (which is increasing claims for social
protection) together with the deep-rooted nature of the social securities
inherited from the communist period, is putting this new approach of a
minimal social policy into question.
In this article we intend to examine the transformation of
social policy in the transition from communism to a market economy, and we will focus on the Russian case. First of all, we explain
social policy in force during the Soviet planning system, which
will bring forward elements of reference for analysis. Secondly,
we will focus on the social policy which is a consequence of the
process of reforms aiming at a market economy. Finally, we will.
provide an in-depth analysis of the consequences of the divestiture of the social assets of company provided social services.
ournal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2001, Volume XXVIII, Number 1

88

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Social Policy in the Traditional
Centrally Planned Economy
Social policy in the traditional centrally planned economy
was basically characterized by the principles of universality of
protection and solidarity among citizens. Throughout the period
of the prevalence of the Soviet planning system, two main tools
allowed for the development of social policy:
Firstly, price policy was to remain at the service of planning.
Thus, prices were of a political nature, that is to say, they had
neither an economic role nor reflected the benefit or the shortage
of goods. The system of prices was a dual one, as different prices
existed for industrial products and consumer goods. Household
consumer prices were the principal tool of the incomes policy
and did not reflect the costs of production, thus allowing for
the consolidation of a norm of consumption of basic products
accessible to all Soviet citizens. Such a policy of prices allowed
in its turn for the maintenance of a planned salary system with a
low salary structure (Chavance, 1987).
Secondly, there was a wide range of non-monetary benefits
provided by the state-owned companies. These companies that
provided social services were of three types: (1) services provided
for current workers in the company during the course of their
work and as a benefit of employment (for example, subsidized
meals in the on-premise canteens, paid vacations, holiday accommodations in dachas or sanatori, and sports facilities). Such
services in kind constituted part of the workers' wage package,
and thus the benefit of this provision could be balanced by a lower
cash wage; (2) services provided for current workers and their
families alike, for example, pre-school education or health clinics;
(3) services provided for the local community, whether or not
employees were part of the company (e. g. public infrastructure,
hospitals, or transport subsidies) (Commander & Jackman, 1997).
The particular nature of the communist company, which was
a national unity of production and a provider of social services,
conferred a very important role to social policy during centralized
planning, in such a way that each company was bound to direct
a part of its clear profits to social policy by means of the SocioCultural and Housing Funds. By means of these funds and subsi-
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dies granted by the Central Planning Organ (Gosplan), companies
were not only in charge of building houses for their workers, daycare centers for their children, restaurants and supermarkets, but,
moreover, the companies were in charge of administration of the
health and cultural affairs of the country, among other services. In
general, the importance of providing social services was greater
if the company was larger in size and if it belonged to a priority
sector for planning. Definitively, it may be noted that a great deal
of the non-monetary income of Soviet workers was indirectly
distributed through their own companies. These benefits, on the
other hand, complemented the lowest Soviet salaries, stated in
monetary terms.
Implications of the Transition to a
Market Economy on Social Policy
Since 1991, the transition to a market economy has brought
about a number of basic changes in the social policy that had been
implemented in the traditional centrally planned economy. These
reforms have changed the tools used for determining social policy,
and this has meant important consequences for the standard of
living:
" First of all, the policy of economic liberalization in the area
of prices, which started in 1992, has led to the disappearance
of subsidized prices for basic necessity products. As we have
previously seen, the policy of prices of the planned economic
system was one of the main tools of social policy. Nowadays,
however, this kind of policy has been set aside and forgotten because it would be non-viable, given the budgetary and financing
problems which the Russian Federation is facing at the moment.
• Secondly, in respect to the incomes of the population, the liberalization implies, on the one hand, the disappearance of the
planned salaries in such a way that private companies will be
capable of determining their salaries more freely. On the other
hand, from 1995 on it has been considered necessary for incomes
to be based exclusively on individual effort, therefore limiting
the importance given to the social policy as a complementary
element in the monetary income. The carry-over on the part of
the Russian government in the matter of incomes distribution
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has been limited to stipulating the necessity of fixing a guaranteed minimum wage, to the establishment of a progressive
tax system on incomes which restrains their excessive growth,
and to carrying out an indexing policy of the earned revenues
compensating for the variation of prices.
Thirdly, the posture of the state-owned companies as providers
of social services has radically changed as a result of their
privatization. Privatization has brought about at least three
important consequences which affected the living conditions
of the Russian population:
a. Upon the disappearance of the structure of ownership, which
had been mainly state-owned, the spread of the public services was no longer guaranteed, thus affecting the greater
part of the population. This situation would became worse
if, as happened in the Russian case, the distribution of the
resulting wealth from this process of privatization had been
unfavorable to a great part of the working population. Although the working population certainly did not lose wealth
in real terms, since property in the final analysis had previously belonged to the state, this sector of the population did
indeed lose wealth in relative terms, as the redistribution of
property had occurred from the state to a limited number
of private agents: company managers and banks (Panorama
Privatizatsiya, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1997). The rapid curtailment in the intermediary role of the public sector of the
economy, sometimes linked to the need to bring the public
finances under control, accelerated the breakdown of longestablished Soviet institutions that had performed a vital
social safety net role (such as cultural, sports and vacation
camps, public libraries, or art centers) but did not result in the
emergence of adequate substitutes related to organizations
of civil society. Thus, the insufficient level of state support to
social policy during transition led to a reduction, for example,
in the number of day hospitals that was accompanied by
rendering more out-clinic services. At the same time, the average number of visits to doctors per person declined and the
number of beds showed a reduction, outstripping development of out-clinics, consulting, diagnosis and special kinds
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of medical assistance. Limited budgetary possibility during
the transition period explains a reduction in the construction
of new social and cultural facilities (such as libraries, clubs
and cinemas, whose number has been seen to decline in
recent years) and the deterioration of the available facilities
(Shishkin & Rozhdestvenskaya, 1998).
b. The privatization of the state-owned companies has made
the maintenance of the full employment policy that was
in force during the central planning impossible, and the
phenomenon of unemployment appeared for the first time.
Apparently, the problem of unemployment is not a great
problem because of the fact that the unemployment level
registered in relation to the working population for the Russian Federation has and continues to be very poor, as it went
from 1.1% in 1992 to 3.4% in 1996 . However, according
to the OECD and the ILO, the estimated unemployment
was higher: 5.5% in 1992 and 7.8% in 1996. Moreover, some
indicators pointed out that the unemployment levels registered were worse than they appeared to be. For instance, the
number of people who involuntarily worked part-time or
without remuneration in a company has been on the rise,
and reached 5.1% of the total working population in 1995
(Commander & McHale, 1996). Among the explanations for
this peculiar transitional period characterized by its lack of
serious unemployment problems (given that the slump in
production implicitly carried with it a reduction of personnel) we find the fact that the greater part of the process of
privatization of the state-owned companies had been carried
out through internal privatization. This privatization has
left the control of the company in the hands of its internal personnel. On the other hand, the nature of the newly
created private sector generated from self-employment or
from what was a part of the informal sector of the economy,
had also reduced the effect of unemployment in the Russian
economy In the medium term, it is estimated that whereas
companies restructured and adapted themselves to the new
economic situation, they would be eliminating those people
who maintained a formal link with them, but without any
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economic trade-off. These people, then, would be added to
the lists of unemployment.
c. As a result of liberalization and privatization, the disappearance of the planning management of the economy has been
taking place since 1991, and has reduced the companies'
responsibility to assign a substantial part of their benefits
(previously directed through the Socio-Cultural and Housing Fund) to provide social services for the improvement of
their workers' welfare. The contribution of the companies to
the social policy by means of the Federal Budget (via the Social Consumption Fund) has been changed into payments to
Extra-budgetary Funds. A process of divestiture of company
provided social services brought about by the companies,
which stipulated that the responsibility of privatized companies to provide these services should be transferred to the
local governments where these companies were locatedbut only in the event there was an explicit consent on the part
of these governments-. On the other hand, the privatization
of the companies has in turn forced the local governments
to take on responsibility for the financing of these services,
and it is obvious that in a context characterized by serious
financial shortages-which was a result of the early and incipient characteristics of the Russian system for financing-,
the companies will progressively reduce expenses that are
less related to their productive labor.
Fourthly, a process of decentralization of the implementation
of social policy through a substantial reduction of its financing
by the Federal Budget and the formation of extra-budgetary
financing has been witnessed. On March 7, 1995, the Government of the Russian Federation approved Decree No. 235, "On
the transference of Socio-cultural and communal and personal
services in Federal ownership into state property of subjects
of Russian Federation and municipal property" (Freinkman &
Starodrubrovskaya, 1996). However, the result of the transfer of
the responsibility of social sphere to the sub-national governments has not been positive, given that an increase in total social
spending has not come about. Thus, real spending in social
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services in 1996 was 62.4% of what it was in 1991, according
to the Consolidated Budget, which included the items of Social
Policy in the Republican and Local Budgets, as well as NonBudgetary Funds (Institute for Economy in Transition, 1997).
Finally, the economic difficulties associated with the transition
have affected both those already living near the poverty line
in the pre-transition period-consisting mainly of pensioners
subsisting on minimum pensions, single-parent families, and
families with several children-and others who, while were
not necessarily near the poverty line at that time, saw their
real incomes eroded as a result of the particularly harsh effect
of the transition on their individual sectors or industriesfor example workers living in city-companies ("closed" cities)
affiliated with the military-industrial complex in outlying regions of Russia, engineers working in heavy industry, as well
as public sector workers employed in education and health
centers-. As a result of the reforms, it has been estimated that
people with income levels below a rather austere minimum
subsistence level of some 200,000 roubles a month ($45) went
from some 1.2% of the total population (or about 45 million
people) in the year 1989 to 21.5% in 1996 (Lopez Claros &
Alexashenko, 1998).
Nevertheless, income welfare measures in an economy undergoing profound structural transformations need to be interpreted with care, given the large fluctuations in relative prices,
and the shifts in the structure of the economy and in the (formal
or informal) sources of activity and income. A more complete
picture of social conditions is thus obtained by supplementing
income based indicators with others measures that attempt to
capture certain aspects of the standard of living. Between 1989
and 1995, some indicators of welfare evolved as follows: (1) 36%
drop in the net birth rate; (2) 46% increase in the net death rate; (3)
sharp increases in the incidence of certain diseases (diphtheria,
measles and tuberculosis); (4) a six and three years decline in the
life expectancy for men and women respectively; (5) extremely
large increases in violent deaths and the incidence of crime in
general (Lopez Claros & Alexashenko, 1998).
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The Process of Divestiture of Company
Provided Social Services

The transition toward a market economy and privatization
encouraged the divestiture of the developed social functions traditionally provided by the communist companies. Legal arrangements for the status of companies' social assets in Russia were
determined by two decrees that specified the transfer of the social
services to the local and municipal governments and the possibility that the companies could sell or rent their social patrimony
to private institutions as well as to individuals. Thus, on December 23, 1993, the Russian Federation Government passed Decree
No. 1325, "On the financing of socio-cultural and communal and
personal services being transferred into the authority of local
bodies of executive power during the privatization of companies". Additionally, the State Committee for Management of State
Property (GKI) passed Letter no. 13/648 "On procedure for transferring company housing stock, housing maintenance and housing repair units servicing this stock into Municipal Ownership"
(Freinkman & Starodrubrovskaya, 1996). The arguments behind
this emphasis on divestiture (externalization) are that Russian
firms will not be able to compete effectively in the market if they
are at the same time burdened with having to run various social
services, and that, at least in some contexts, company closure
could lead to a collapse in the provision of essential services if
these had previously been provided by the company. In practice,
the situation is rather more complex, and the prospects for achieving benefits from divestiture in the absence of parallel reforms
of the housing and local government finance systems are much
less clear-cut than these simple claims suggest (Commander &
Jackman, 1997).
The federal regulations for company provided social services
varied across different types of social assets. Thus, a part of social
assets, such as health, educational, cultural and sports facilities,
was allowed to be included in the charter capital of companies,
with an obligation to keep the profile of these assets unchanged.
Another group of assets, which includes housing together with
attached utilities networks (so long as they are not situated on
the land belonging to the company), as well as maintenance units
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of companies with all their so-called 'material base', cannot be
included in the charter capital and must be divested to municipalities according to the time schedule approved by municipal
administrations but within six months after privatization. Before
divestiture takes place, these assets are to be kept on the balance
sheets of the companies. At the same time, companies were not
forced to included any social assets in their property, if their employees did not want to do so and did not intend to include them
in the privatization plan. In cases where some assets are located on
land belonging to companies but are used for municipal needs,
they have been transformed into the common property of the
privatization companies but are used for municipal needs, and
they have to be transformed into the common property of the
privatizing companies and the local authorities' (Freinkman &
Starodrubrovskaya, 1996).
Attitude of Companies toward the Divesture of Company Provided
Social Services
In practice, companies have widely attempted to economize
on providing benefits, but the extent of divesture to date is less
than might have been expected. Thus, although 33% of the Russian companies reduced their social benefits during the years 1992
and 1996, this reduction was not the result of the transfer of the
entirety of the company provided social services, but only of some
of the infrastructure. In this way, it appears as though the total
social spending by companies in Russia remains at its very high
pre-reform level of 20% of gross wage costs (Lefvre, 1998).
Apart from these general tendencies, however, we must point
out some of the variables that condition the particular evolution
of each company:
(1) Traditionally, the company that provided social services benefited from taxation privileges, which allowed for the payment
of less taxes, provided that a part of them were deductible
by way of welfare payments. Since late 1995, however, the
Russian Government has abolished a number of tax exemptions that were formerly extended to entrepreneurial activity
in this field.
Under current tax laws, companies have the right to deduct their social expenditure from both the tax on profits
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(but not to exceed 50% of the amount of tax due) and from
the 1.5% local turnover tax, which can be introduced (and
in practice has already been introduced almost everywhere)
by local governments specifically to finance housing and facilities. However, the local implementation of these federal
regulations varies greatly across municipalities, which use
different options for regulation of the profit tax and turnover
tax deductions. The major differences are of three types: differences in the way costs are credited against corresponding
taxes, differences in the way tax credit mechanisms are applied, and differences in the way deductions from the two
different taxes are combined (Freinkman & Starodrubrovskaya, 1996).

(2) The formation of a structure of basically private property
rights, immediately after the privatization of the national
and private companies of new creation, has raised contrary
opinions between the shareholders in the companies with
regard to the providing of social services. In this sense, three
tendencies in the Board of Management can be distinguished,
depending on the origin (internal or external action ) and
the majority generation (age) to which the different representatives belong. On one side, in general, the younger staff
is inclined to be in favor of the entire transfer of the social
services to the municipality. On the contrary, the older staff is
more opposed to the idea of this transfer, and do not consider
it appropriate to admit that they are going to leave their
workers without at least some form of social support from the
company. It is argued that this paternalistic attitude reveals
the splendor of a company and it is a mechanism to attract
prestigious workers to the company. On the other hand, the
external shareholders in the company disagree with this use
of profits, and they opt for the disappearance of the provision
for company provided social services. In fact, the financing
difficulties and the disappearance of the state subsidies make
it more difficult to justify the cost of maintaining the subsidies
before the external shareholders of the company, who are
receiving little in the form of dividends. For example, Uneximbank, the capitalist firm that bought 38% of Norilsk Nikel for
$618 million in a controversial auction in 1997, wanted Norilsk
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Nickel to free themselves from their social policy activities (The
Economist, 1998). Definitively, depending on the correlation
of powers in the Board of Management (whether there is a
greater or lesser number of external shareholders) and the
capacity for influence of the workers (whether they are older
or younger) over the decisions made by the entity, the strategy
to be followed by the company for the providing of social
services tends to vary.
(3) Independent of whatever previous decision has been made,
however, there is another variable which greatly influences
the evolution of company provided social services immediately after privatization of a company. And this is, precisely,
that size (Alm & Sjoquist, 1995), expressed as much in absolute
terms (number of workers) as in relative terms (in function of
the number of employees or the productive activity concentrated in a given region) determines the following typology
in terms of the social policy:
a. The most common case refers to small and medium companies located in big cities, which have been progressively
separated from the larger part of their infrastructures and
social services transferring them to the local authorities,
which are the administrations in charge of managing the
social policy at present. Of all existing companies in the
Russian Federation in 1995, 10% transferred the responsibility of the social expenditures to the municipality, and
30% of the rights of the existing infrastructures in the company in order to provide social services (Blasi, Kroumova
& Kruse, 1997).
b. Companies, as a result of the privatization and the disappearance of the state subsidies (Blasi et al., 1997) had begun
to increase cost recovery by raising user fees, generally
by applying differential tariffs for non-employee access to
services or by making company provided social services
independent by commercialising them, either by marketing
or renting the infrastructures to other companies and, in
some cases, to the workers themselves employed in the
company in the social policy. In fact, 5% of the companies
transferred their social services to their workers in 1995
(Alm & Sjoquist, 1995).
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On the contrary, the services which were not profitable,
or that remained in the company, progressively deteriorated given the scarcity of funds available for their maintenance, or they were eliminated. Thus, 18% of all Russian
companies eliminated any social expenditure during 1995
(Blasi et al., 1997).
c. Exceptionally, the most profitable companies, which were
generally the largest ones, only ceased subsidizing company provided social services while they were having financial problems and, once they had recovered, they took
these activities up again. This is the case, for instance, of the
steel production company Ore (Kabalina, 1996).
d. Although less habitual, the justification or reasons given
by medium or big companies were more problematic when
they represented the whole of the greater part of the activity
of a sole region. The city-companies which were created
in the Soviet regions of difficult access because of bad
weather conditions and national security matters, were the
towns generally associated to the Atomic Energy Ministry
(Lefkvre, 1993). These companies owned a network of infrastructures assigned to the social security benefit for their
workers which were extendible to the population of the
region concerned. These facilities were developed to such
a degree that it was difficult for them to be transferred to
the local authorities, given the fact that this would have
surpassed the monetary resources or even the materials
needed to be able to make them functional. In general,
these companies continued with these services, although
the maintenance of their quantity and quality depended
on their financial situation. One outstanding example is
Norilsky Nikel AO, the most important nickel manufacturer
in the USSR, located in Norilsk (Krasnoyarsk oblast'). The
financial difficulties of this company involved a reduction
of the amount of social services in the year 1996, which represented 22% healthcare, 61% education, 18% culture and
2% sports as compared to the year 1992 (Aberkeeba, 1997).

(4) There is a different attitude towards two different groups
of social assets: kindergartens, housing and dormitories are
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considered to be a major burden by a relatively large group
of companies, and the fate of these assets is now the most
painful issue; however, sports facilities, cultural centers, hospitals and clinics are considered much easier (Freinkman &
Starodrubrovskaya, 1996). There is a link between company
profitability and the level of cost recovery in social assets
financed by the companies; thus, the more difficult the financial situation of the company is, the greater the pressure for
restructuring social assets. However, although the motivation
for providing a wide scale of benefits in larger firms was in
large part economic, it is important to appreciate the noneconomic factors, which have deeper psychological and cultural roots, that are behind the phenomenon that explains the
maintenance of the social policy in the companies, because
they do not consider it appropriate to admit that they are
going to leave their workers without at least some forms of
social support from the company. Evidence from the World
Bank business survey suggests that a significant proportion of
the labor force continues to have entitlements to food subsidy,
healthcare, child care, holiday resort, housing and transportation subsidy (Commander & Jackman, 1997), because of the
fact that more than half the managers of responding firms
continued to provide these social benefits. In addition, it was
usual that most of the companies had maintained at least the
system of distribution of goods and services with subsidised
prices for their workers-which had become institutionalized
in the years of economic shortage. Nowadays, the main suppliers of goods which are able to maintain these services are:
(1) retail businesses and the great trade organizations that
sell their products to the companies, with discounts over the
market price which fluctuate between 10% and 30%, (2) the
associates from the industries who use this activity to pay
their debts to the companies, or have an agreement for exchange of goods at a favorable price, generally at a cost price,
(3) farms which are subsidiary to the companies. Previously,
these were used for the hiring of workers or to employ inactive
ones in the companies. Nowadays, they constitute a good way
of supplying food to the workers as an incentive or as a way
of payment in kind, and they do not represent a too elevated
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cost provided that they belong to the company and that they
are producing (Lefkvre, 1993).
(5) Finally, we should point out that companies continue to provide workers with benefits in kind, and that these represent
the majority within what can be referred to as social services.
On the contrary, the volume of the monetary benefits, the
traditional ones (which are subsidized in the prices of certain
goods, scholarships, etc.), as well as the new type, which is
to say, by means of the contribution to the extra-budgetary
funds (adhesion of the company to the benefits of salaried
workers, to private funds for pensions or medical insurance),
depends on the company's economic and financial situation,
as well as to the degree of monetization used in the exchanges
of the company-which is low if we take into consideration
that exchanges for barter represented 50% of the GDP in 1996(Aukutsionek, 1998).
Conclusions
Since 1991, the reforms aimed at the conversion of the Russian
society into a market economy have radically changed the idea
of social policy inherited from the USSR. In this way, institutional change has progressively come about, thus transforming
the organizational structure of social policy as well as the financing mechanisms. The conception of social policy, no longer of a
universal nature and based on the principals of solidarity, has
become basically a welfare sort of policy. Progressively, the Russian Government has emphasized the need for incomes to derive
exclusively from individual effort, thus limiting the importance
of social policy as a complementary element to monetary income.
Additionally, the economic transition, basically by means of privatization and liberalization of the economy, has brought about
a reduction in the social securities and, therefore, a worsening in
the living conditions of the Russian population.
Thus, independent of the greater or lesser degree of equity
in the process of distribution of ownership, which was mostly
state-owned in the past, the most immediate consequences of
privatization for the Russian population are obvious. First of
all, the reduction of the public assets does not guarantee the
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spreading of the public services to the population. Secondly, the
Russian companies have stopped being paternalistic institutions
which looked after the interests of their workers, and they have
progressively stopped supplying the previous social services they
provided for. This has happened in such a way that the workers of
these companies have witnessed the reduction of a part of their
non-monetary compensation, as the services which previously
covered the greater part of their daily activity, including their
houses, which they would now have to buy, have ceased to exist.
This situation has not been accompanied, in general terms, by
the rise of their direct salary, expressed in monetary terms. Additionally, the privatization of the companies overrules the strategy
of full employment, with the phenomenon of unemployment
raising its head for the first time, with its consequent effects upon
the standard of living.
On the other hand, the liberalization of prices and incomes
has worsened the life conditions of the Russian population, as
salaries have in real terms decreased, and the subsidies on prices
have disappeared, a situation which affects to a great extent those
people with lower incomes.
With regard to the process of decentralization in the social
policy, promoted by the Federal Government by means of transference to the local governments, this has come about gradually, and in some cases the companies continue to finance these
services. In reality, financing of the social services still remains
considerably centralized, but responsibility for allocation of these
funds and their utilization is not strictly defined. The undefined
division of power between various state managing bodies results
in erosion of responsibility of the state as a whole for provision
of public goods to the population. There are no funds for the
adequate functioning of the available system of rendering social
and cultural services to the population. With the funds that are
available, this system is only degrading. But no one is assuming
the responsibility to officially revise the conditions and the scale of
rendering social and cultural services and goods to the population
free of charge or on a preferential basis.
Among the reasons under which companies continue to provide social services we find, first of all, that the companies consider paternalism to be a measure of prosperity and prestige
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for them, and not only just an expense. Secondly, up until the
year 1995 it was beneficial for companies to keep on providing
social services due to the taxation privileges they enjoyed. Finally,
local governments do not often accept the transference of social
assets because of budgetary problems, given that the responsibility in social policy has hardly been conferred to budgetary
considerations.
Neither the process of privatization nor the decentralization of
the social policy have managed to solve the problems of social policy. On the one hand, it is generally considered that the role of the
companies in social policy matters will continue to be important
during some time. Different factors explain that the maintenance
of company provided social services is still important for the
Russian companies. In the first place, these social services are
being used by the companies to negotiate labor issues. In the
second place, social policy can become a source of revenues if the
price for the use of certain social infrastructures becomes stable.
In third place, the goods and services offered by the companies
can be used for exchange in trading operations or for any other
operations that might be attractive to companies faced with growing financial problems or that are finding a minimum degree of
monetization in the exchanges. In fourth place, some company
managers consider social policy to be their own responsibility.
Although the motivation for providing a broad scale of benefits
in larger firms was based on economic considerations, it is important to appreciate the non-economic factors, which have deeper
psychological and cultural roots behind the phenomenon. This
would tend to explain why companies tend to keep on maintaining social services, because they do not consider it appropriate
to admit that they are going to leave their workers without at
least some forms of social support from the company. Lastly, the
financial difficulties of those who have had to face the leaders of
the local governments impedes divesture of the companies from
these services that they wish to eliminate.
The problem of the transference of the social services is more
complex than what the Russian authorities were able to predict. Furthermore, the budgetary uncertainty accompanying this
transference of the social services is negative for the local governments and it lays the foundations of the regional inequality in the
living conditions of the Russian population.
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As we have confirmed throughout the previous pages, social
policy of the Russian Federation is confronting a double set of
problems. Firstly, its aim of reducing social protection arises in
a context of progressive worsening of the standard of living
of the Russian population. Furthermore, the main problem of
Russian social policy has been the gap that exists between the
broad range of obligations of the state towards the citizens, inherited from the Soviet past, and the real volume of the actual
budgetary financing. It will be difficult to close this gap (given
the problems of tax collection). The social policy will therefore
face an even greater decline in the future. Secondly, the transfer
of the responsibility in social matters to the Local Governments
is produced in an environment of considerable vagueness. Both
of these aspects are creating a great deal of uncertainty in social
policy matters.
Different from what occurs in the market economies, the
Russian challenge is tantamount to transferring social policy from
the area of responsibility of the privately owned companies to
the area of public responsibility. However, this nationalization
of social policy is occurring with a scarce commitment on the
side of the Russian public sector. Furthermore, participation of
the private sector in social policy is not at all significant at the
present time, either. It remains very much to be seen, over a mid
term and long term period, whether the social cost that will be
transferred to the local budgets or the population will be able to
assume this expenditure, either by means of taxes or by paying
the market price. In large part due to problems in collecting tax,
it will be very difficult to close this gap.
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